Celina ALPR WatchWhat Celina drivers should know

Policy and law

Rules can limit use. They do not undo the collection.

Celina's policy includes real safeguards, but the system still creates searchable records about ordinary travel before suspicion exists. The stronger local choice is to end the program.

Official recordRemoval position

Why policy is not enough

The unresolved issue is structural.

This project does not allege that every search is improper. It argues that even compliant use leaves Celina operating a large, searchable, shareable record of vehicle movements.

01

No suspicion threshold

The policy says reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before an authorized user queries the system. Policy source

02

Broad permitted purposes

Published purposes include electronic surveillance and homeland security without narrow definitions in the public policy. Policy source

03

Data has two routes out

The policy says reads go to Texas DPS every 24 hours. Flock's agency-sharing network is a separate route. Policy Portal

04

The public search audit is not published

Celina publishes a total search count but not the search-level audit that would let residents examine when, why, and across how large a network searches were run.

Stronger rules could reduce some risks, but they would not stop routine collection. That is why this site supports ending the program.

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Texas DPS transfer

The public records do not settle how long DPS keeps Celina's reads.

Celina's policy says the department sends reads to DPS every 24 hours and says DPS keeps them for 30 days. The standard DPS agreement says contributed data is kept for at least three years unless the user agency requests a shorter period.

That standard form also allows DPS to share contributed data with authorized criminal justice and law-enforcement agencies. Celina's signed agreement and any request for shorter retention have not been published, so the exact terms in force are still unverified. Celina policy Standard DPS agreement

Public audit comparison

The records are auditable. Celina does not publish the search-level audit.

Official record Celina's policy requires every detection-browsing inquiry to include a case or call number and/or a reason. The policy says individual credentials make use fully auditable, and the City's technology page says access is logged indefinitely. Yet Celina's portal displays only the total number of searches—not a query-level public log. Celina policy City technology page Celina portal

Inference Multiple Texas agencies use the same Flock portal platform to publish a downloadable 30-day Public Search Audit, including Temple, Pflugerville, and Denton. Arvada remains one detailed example: its file masks user IDs while showing timestamps, network counts, and offense types. These are public audit exports, not unredacted personnel logs. The comparisons establish that the platform supports search-level disclosure; they do not establish why Celina omits it. Temple example Pflugerville example Denton example Arvada example

Published rules

Current Celina safeguards

  • A legitimate law-enforcement purpose is required.
  • Each search records a case or call number and/or a reason.
  • Users have individual credentials and complete training.
  • Search and access activity is auditable.
  • Alerts require image, vehicle, plate, and NCIC verification before action.
  • Immigration enforcement, traffic enforcement, harassment, intimidation, personal use, protected-class-only searches, and First Amendment infringement are prohibited.
  • The data may not be sold.

Celina ALPR policy Police technology page

Published-policy gaps

What remains unclear or absent

  • The policy says reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before a query.
  • Broad purposes such as electronic surveillance and homeland security are not narrowly defined in the public policy.
  • No periodic-audit schedule is published.
  • Celina reports a total search count but does not publish the search-level audit, reasons, offense types, network scope, or outside-agency activity.
  • Nationwide sharing is published without a clear recipient approval, review, and removal process.
  • Confirmed outcomes and false positives are not published.
  • The 41 expansion locations are not disclosed, and the reviewed public records do not establish whether the Nova modules included in the approved purchase package were activated or used.
  • The later order creates long renewal exposure.
  • Celina's signed DPS agreement, any shorter-retention request, downstream access, and deletion records are not published.

Not publicly confirmed These are gaps in public materials, not findings that a rule was violated or a record does not exist. Published policy Public portal 2025 order form

Legal context

What Texas and federal law currently say

Not legal adviceThis is a plain-language research summary dated August 2, 2026.
01
Inference

No comprehensive Texas ALPR statute found

As of August 2, 2026, the research did not identify a comprehensive Texas law specifically setting warrant, retention, audit, and sharing rules for law-enforcement ALPR systems. HB 961 and HB 2083 proposed protections but did not become law. HB 961 text HB 961 history HB 2083 text HB 2083 history

02

Consumer privacy law does not fill the gap

Texas's general consumer privacy statute exempts state agencies and political subdivisions, so it is not a substitute for a municipal ALPR ordinance. Texas Business and Commerce Code Chapter 541

03

Public records law covers existing city records

The Texas Public Information Act generally reaches existing city records, while law-enforcement, motor-vehicle, privacy, security, and other exceptions may allow or require withholding or redaction. A request should ask for records, not require the city to create a new report or answer questions. Texas Government Code Chapter 552 Attorney General guidance Celina request guidance

04

Fifth Circuit precedent is fact-specific

In United States v. Porter, decided March 17, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held that the periodic public-road LPR observations at issue were not a Fourth Amendment search. The case involved a local network of no more than ten cameras. It does not necessarily resolve every denser, longer-term, or multi-jurisdictional tracking scenario. Fifth Circuit opinion

Current Fifth Circuit precedent permits the limited LPR use considered in Porter without a warrant. Broader networked tracking may raise different legal questions, and Celina can adopt protections stronger than the constitutional minimum.
05

Carpenter was not an ALPR case

The U.S. Supreme Court treated long-term historical cell-site location records as a search in Carpenter v. United States. That case concerned cell-site data, not automated license plate readers. U.S. Supreme Court opinion

Do not overread the law. The sources do not establish that ALPRs are categorically constitutional or unconstitutional, and proposed bills are not enacted safeguards. A constitutional minimum is also not a command to operate this program: Celina's elected officials can choose not to collect.

The local policy choice

End the program instead of normalizing it.

Ask Council to review the program in public, disclose the missing local outcomes, and move toward ending collection and removing all 47 readers.

Take action